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Abstract
We estimate models of labour demand for a panel of 3,400 Spanish manufactur-
ing …rms over the period 1985-2001. We examine the roles of ‡exible labour through
temporary contracts, …nancial factors and a policy reform in 1997 a¤ecting permanent
contracts by lowering payroll taxes and dismissal costs. Compared to permanent em-
pl oyme nt, the deman  for ‡exibl e lab our displays (i) greater sensiti vity to …nancial fac -
tors (ii) greater cyclical sensitivity (iii) a larger average wage elasticity (iv) less inertia.
Our an alysis o f t he 1 99 7 p ol icy r ef or m …n ds an e¤e ct o f p ayro l l ta x es on empl oy me nt. A
5 p e rc enta ge p oint r ed uc tio n i n th e payr oll tax in cr ea s es l ab o ur de ma nd by 8 p er cent .
JE L C o d e s : J 23 , J 32 .
Key words : lab our demand; …nancial pressure; temp orary cont ra ct s.
1 Introduction
Labour ‡exibility remains a …ercely debated issue. It is commonly alleged that Europe’s
lack of labour ‡exibility has hindered its economic growth and labour market perfor-
mance resulting in excessive and persistent unemployment. This is most often attributed
to what are deemed excessive costs incurred in shedding labour and high payroll taxes.1
Within Europe, the case of Spain has merited closest attention. This partly re‡ects
the view that Spain has been the most acute example of the European unemployment
problem, associated with its traditionally high levels of employment protection and par-
ticularly high unemployment rates.2 A second important reason for wider interest in the
Spanish experience stems from the series of reforms that have been introduced. These
reforms have in‡uenced policy elsewhere in Europe, notably in France and Italy.
Reform in Spain was initiated through the liberalisation of ‡exible contracts.
From the mid-1980s, temporary contracts in Spain experienced their most widespread
adoption of any industrialised economy, with almost one-third of employees employed
under a temporary contract during the 1990s.3 However, during this latter period, an
era of continued high unemployment, it has been argued that a dual labour market
may have developed based upon the possession of a permanent versus temporary labour
contract with conversion rates from the latter to the former being low. This may in
turn have had perverse e¤ects on wage determination, impeding any ‡exibility bene…ts of
1For a review of this debate see OECD (1999) and Nickell and Layard (1999).
2 In fact, a majority of European countries have unemployment rates lower than that of the United
States at the time of writing. The high regulation and unemployment story at best only …ts the largest
four European economies of Germany, France, Italy and Spain (Nickell, 2002).
3Temporary work agencies have been permitted since 1994.
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temporary contracts being translated into improved employment performance. Partly
in response to this, policy has since reduced the appeal to employers of opting for
temporary contracts (Dolado et al. 2002). To some extent this was achieved through a
policy reform of 1997 which reduced payroll taxes and dismissal costs associated with
permanent contracts.
Motivated by such issues, this paper examines labour demand at the …rm-level,
focusing on the case of Spain and the distinction between temporary and permanent
labour. The starting point to the paper is an analysis by Bentolila and Saint-Paul
(1992), who considered the consequences of temporary contracts for labour demand,
also focusing on the experience of Spain. Their empirical analysis was conducted for
a panel of …rms but restricted to the sample period 1985-88. Our …rst contribution is
to extend the sample period examined for a similar panel of manufacturing …rms but
to cover the period 1985-2001. This extension is not inconsequential since a central
hypothesis highlighted by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) is the di¤erent behaviour of
demand for the two labour contract types over the economic cycle. To include a period
of cyclical downturn, as was the case in Spain in 1993, is therefore a useful extension.
Second, and more signi…cantly, we consider the e¤ects of the labour reform of
1997. Dolado et al. (2002) suggest that the 1997 reform may have been important
in reducing the unemployment rate in Spain during the late-1990s. This reform has
as yet received much less attention to date than the earlier reform of 1984 which was
responsible for the major liberalisation of ‡exible contracts. Moreover in its scope
and anticipated e¤ects the latter reform was rather di¤erent. Rather than producing
an alternative to o¤ering employment under a permanent contract, as under the 1984
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reform, the reform of 1997 focused on altering the conditions of those (subsequently)
hired under a permanent contract, speci…cally by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal
costs. The di¤erence in approach re‡ected a desire to reduce the insulation of permanent
contract sta¤, partly provided by the existence of a bu¤er of temporary workers, to wage
settlements.
We focus on the e¤ects of the payroll tax reduction for labour demand, which
constituted an important part of the 1997 reform in Spain. To date, a consensus has
yet to emerge on the consequences of payroll taxes (and labour taxes more generally)
for labour demand and employment. Previous studies have been largely based on ag-
gregate evidence drawn from international comparisons. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for
instance, argue that much of the increase in unemployment across industrialized coun-
tries, particularly in continental Europe between 1965 and 1995, can be explained by
increasing labour taxes. Other macroeconomic evidence has found modest e¤ects from
labour taxes to unemployment (see Nickell and Layard, 1999). In this paper, we pro-
vide microeconomic evidence on the e¤ects of payroll taxes on labour demand exploiting
variation across …rms in the e¤ects of the 1997 reform on Spanish …rms.
Third, the potential role of …nancial factors in in‡uencing labour demand is
highlighted. Despite the large number of studies of labour demand, very few studies
consider a role for …nancial variables. Notable exceptions are Nickell and Wadhwani
(1991) and Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), both studies of UK quoted …rms, and Ogawa
(2003), a study of Japanese …rms. This limited number of studies that consider a
role for …nancial variables might seem surprising given the large number of studies of
…xed investment which do …nd a role for …nancial variables (see Hubbard, 1998). An
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additional aim of our analysis is to consider how …nancial factors di¤erentially a¤ect
the demand for permanent and temporary employment. To what extent is the kind of
employment response to …nancial pressure highlighted by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999),
borne by those on temporary contracts in an economy where such contracts have been
widely adopted?
Fourth, we therefore examine the demand for ‡exible labour explicitly. This
allows the consideration of a number of additional hypotheses from the Bentolila and
Saint-Paul (1992) model that they did not consider or for which they were unable to
uncover empirical support given the short time dimension of their panel of …rms. This
includes the predictions that temporary employment should be less persistent than that
of permanent sta¤, and that the responsiveness to wage costs should be greater. In
so doing we aim to shed further light on the consequences of ‡exible contracts for the
labour market.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the Spanish
labour market including the reform of 1997 and, drawing on the theoretical model of
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), describes the hypotheses of interest. Section 3 presents
data description and estimation results for our panel of 3,400 Spanish manufacturing
…rms for the period 1985-2001. Section 4 concludes.
2 Economic background
This section …rst describes the general characteristics of the Spanish labour market
and relevant policy reforms undertaken in Spain. In arriving at a set of hypotheses we
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wish to confront with our company-level data, we also summarise the implications of a
model presented by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) which considers the consequences
for labour demand of ‡exible contracts.
Unemployment in Spain has been amongst the highest in Europe since the early
1980s, increasing from 7 per cent in 1978 to 21 per cent by 1985, with a particularly
high incidence of long-term unemployment. Recognition of the poor performance of the
Spanish labour market led to a number of reforms. Moreover the Spanish approach to
reform has since been adopted by other European countries. France and Italy have since
pursued a similar approach of attempting to increase labor market ‡exibility through
the liberalisation of temporary contracts.
The highly regulated nature of the Spanish labour market re‡ects above all the
degree of employment protection. Since a number of descriptions of the institutional
background in Spain exist (see for example, Jimeno and Toharia, 1994; Dolado et al.
2002), we o¤er only a broad outline here. Many of the institutional characteristics of
the Spanish labour market at least through the 1980s, were inherited from the Franco
regime. Although the transition to democracy from 1978 involved the legalisation of
trade unions and the introduction of a relatively generous unemployment bene…t system,
the rules governing employment protection remained largely intact. In 1984, a major
reform was undertaken in an attempt to enhance ‡exibility through the substantial
liberalisation of temporary contracts, previously restricted to seasonal work. Initially,
temporary contracts could be signed for up to 6 months at a time and renewed for up
to 3 years, with low or zero dismissal costs, whilst their non-renewal or conversion to
permanent status could not be appealed to tribunals. In contrast, the process of appeal
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to labour courts under permanent contracts frequently imposed substantial costs on
employers. Under such contracts …ring costs have depended upon the seniority of the
employee and on the reason for dismissal. Those with such contracts had a right to
appeal and this appeal procedure has played an important role in determining actual
dismissal costs.4 For instance, from 1994 dismissals for economic or technological reasons
were permitted but even in this case if the dismissal was judged as unfair then the worker
was entitled to reinstatement or (for contracts signed before 1997) 45 days’ salary per
year of tenure up to a maximum of 42 months’ salary as well as the foregone salary
during the period of job loss. Even if it was judged fair then the worker received a
severance payment of 20 days wages’ per year of tenure up to a maximum of 12 months’
salary. The probability of an unfair verdict is estimated as 0.72 by Galdón-Sánchez and
Güell (2000).5
It was subsequently realised that the two-tier labour market encouraged by the
introduction and widespread adoption of temporary contracts–which by 1990 repre-
sented around one-third of employees–had likely resulted in a number of distortions. In
particular it was argued that temporary workers were used as a bu¤er against adverse
shocks and that the interests of permanent workers dominated wage negotiations and
4Malo (2000) emphasises that actual dismissal costs incurred by the …rm exceed the ‘fair’ statutory
minimum. For instance, a majority of workers dismissed for disciplinary or general economic reasons
have sued their employer and an out of court settlement has typically followed (see Malo (2000) for an
analysis). Average actual severance payments increased for almost 5 months salary in 1981 to over 12
months’ salary by 1993 (Dolado and Jimeno, 1997).
5The system of wage negotiation, being highly centralised, reinforces the lack of ‡exibility (see Bover
et al. 2002).
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these workers (‘insiders’) were excessively insulated from the employment consequences
of wage settlements (eg. Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Dolado and Jimeno, 1997). Re-
forms introduced since the mid-1990s have generally aimed to reduce the attractiveness
of o¤ering employment on a temporary contract. The most signi…cant of these reforms
took place in 1997.
The 1997 reform reduced payroll taxes by between 40 and 90 per cent for (new)
permanent contracts and for conversions of temporary into permanent contracts for large
groups of workers, notably those aged under 30 and over 45, the long-term unemployed,
and the disabled.6 It also reduced dismissal costs for unfair dismissals for economic
reasons by around 25 per cent (ie. to 33 days’ salary per year of tenure). Kugler et
al. (2002) estimate that the reform reduced labour costs (of young workers) in the …rst
year of the permanent contract by 9.9 per cent and 9.5 per cent for men and women,
respectively and in the second year by 7.9 per cent and 7.3 per cent respectively. Around
80 to 90 per cent of the reduction in labour costs is attributed to the payroll tax reduction
and it is this aspect of the overall reform that we focus on. As emphasised by Kugler
et al. (2002), the 1997 reform was by no means a marginal one.
To date, much of the evidence on ‡exible/temporary contracts has focused upon
the experience of Spain. Most of these studies have been presented in the light of the
1984 reform. Kugler et al. (2002) examine the impact of the 1997 reform in terms of
employment and worker ‡ows from Spanish labour force survey data. They …nd evidence
that the reform increased permanent employment probabilities for younger employees.
6The reduction in payroll taxes lasted for the …rst two years of a new permanent contract and one
year for a conversion to a permanent contract.
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Results for other types of workers …nds insigni…cant e¤ects. Our analysis instead adopts
a …rm-level approach, looking more explicitly at its e¤ects on the demand-side of the
labour market.
As a framework for understanding labour demand in a labour market with per-
manent and ‡exible contracts, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) present a model in which
there is labour heterogeneity in the form of two types of labour, rigid labour (Type I)
and ‡exible labour (Type II). Workers of the two types are remunerated at rates of w1
and w2 respectively. In the event of redundancy, Type I workers will impose a cost
f on the employer, whilst ‡exible labour can be dismissed without incurring such an
adjustment cost. It is assumed that ‡exible workers are less productive perhaps because
the …rm itself has a stronger incentive to invest in …rm-speci…c skills where the worker
is on a permanent contract. A ‡exible worker is equivalent in productivity terms to
½ rigid employees (½ < 1). Those on permanent contracts however, are thought to be
able to exploit this greater insider power and the existence of f turnover costs when
replacing them, by bargaining higher wages (w1 > w2). This wage is however, taken to
be predetermined and not considered explicitly as part of the model.
Given availability of ‡exible contracts, the preferred solution requires that rigid
workers are preferable to ‡exible workers where the …ring cost is not incurred (ie. w1 <
w2=½) and that ‡exible workers are preferred to rigid workers during an expansion
where the …rm may have to incur the turnover cost f should a downturn materialise (ie.
w2=½ < w1 + °f). The solution obtained involves only ‡exible workers being recruited
during expansions since the marginal cost is less than that expected under recruitment
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of employees on rigid contracts. Moreover, in a recession, no temporary contract workers
will be employed, nor will rigid workers be made redundant during a downturn. Each
…rm is subject to idiosyncratic and aggregate demand shocks which govern the likelihood
of entering a downturn. The burden of adjustment to cyclical e¤ects therefore falls on
temporary contract workers.
The central implic at ions which eme rg e from the mo del are the fol l wi ng.
· F l exib le lab o ur is mo re re sp on si ve to comp any-sp e ci… c d eman d s h o ck s tha n i s th e
demand for rigid/permanent labour.
· The resp onse of rigid employme nt to an aggregate recession is smo other than the
response of ‡exible employment.
· A l ower deg re e o f p e rs ist en ce f or te mp o r ar y e mployment , fo llowin g f ro m the l ower
adjustment costs incurred through adjusting temporary employment.
·  The wage elasticity of lab our demand is (in absolut e terms) greater in the case of
‡exible than rigid labour. In the available data, the closest we can get to testing
this hypothesis, is to consider the responsiveness of the two types of labour to the
average labour cost at the …rm.7
Bentolila and Saint-Paul’s (1992) empirical analysis consisted of employing a
…rm-level panel, from the same source that we consider below, but for a much more re-
stricted time dimension that for 1985 to 1988. Two central predictions are that labour
demand should be more sensitive to demand shocks after the policy reform of 1984
7This also precludes estimating the substitution of one labour type for another.
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and that employment should display less persistence. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992)
consider these by interacting the demand shock variable (sales growth) and lagged em-
ployment term with a dummy for the 1986-88 period on the grounds that temporary
contracts were much more widely adopted in this period. The evidence supported the
proposition of a greater sensitivity to demand but did not suggest any reduction in
persistence. A number of other hypotheses were also considered. Since temporary
employment is expected to represent a larger share of total employment when a com-
pany is expanding, they considered variation in the labour demand equation over the
(company-speci…c) cycle. There was evidence that employment is less persistent for
companies with higher rates of growth but they …nd no evidence that labour demand
of companies experiencing higher rates of growth is any more sensitive to the demand
shock (the opposite is found). It is suggested that this may be because the demand vari-
able also picks up a role for liquidity or …nancial constraints. Since …nancial constraints
were not investigated directly little more could be said on this hypothesis. Note that
a more direct way to consider a number of these hypotheses is to estimate the demand
for temporary labour directly, which Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) do not do, instead
focusing on variations between companies growing at di¤erent rates.
In addition to the above factors, and going beyond the considerations of the
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) analysis, we also wish to investigate the possible role of
…nancial factors in in‡uencing labour demand. In this context the particular hypothesis
we wish to consider is the following.
·  I f …n an cia l fa ct or s a ls o i n ‡u en ce l ab ou r d eman d ( a s in Ni ckell a nd Wadhwan i ,
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1991), again the burden of adjustment is expected to fall disproportionately on
‡exible labour implying a greater responsiveness to …nancial factors.
Our discussion of the 1997 policy reform motivates the following.
·  I n or d e r t o a dd re ss the e ¤ect s o f t h e p ay ro l l t ax re du ct i on , we c on s tr uct a mea s ur e
of the average payroll tax paid by each …rm and how this was a¤ected by the 1997
reform. The reduction in the payroll tax for new contracts a¤ecting certain groups
of workers implies that this will have varied across …rms and we consider this in
our models for labour demand.
In the next section the analysis considers in turn each of the hypotheses described.
3 Data and Estimation
The paper confronts the hypotheses described above with data from a sample of 3,400
manufacturing …rms in Spain. The labour demand equation, derived by Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1999) from a quadratic adjustment cost model which then adds …nancial
factors, takes the following form.
nit = ®i+¯1nit¡1+¯2nit¡2+¯3wit¡1+¯4¢wit+¯5kit+¯6»it+X
0
it¡1°+ªt+"it (1)
where i indexes companies i=1,2..N and t indexes year t=1,2..T . n is (log) aver-
age company employment during the year, w is the (log) average wage at the company,
k is the (log) capital stock. » is a demand shock proxy which consists of the growth in
log real sales and ªt represent a set of common time e¤ects (year dummies) which will
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control for aggregate e¤ects including aggregate demand.8 "it is a serially uncorrelated
but possibly heteroskedastic error term.
A number of aspects of our estimation of equation (1) warrant comment. First,
…nancial factors, represented by the regressors Xit¡1; are considered. Despite the large
literature …nding evidence of …nancial conditions in shaping …xed and inventory invest-
ment, there are few studies which allow for such a role in the context of labour demand
models. Following from the investment literature a role for the following …nancial vari-
ables is also considered: cash ‡ow CF=K, liquidity m=K; the ‡ow borrowing ratio (ie.
the ratio of interest payments to cash ‡ow) br; and underlying net indebtedness of the
…rm (B¡m)=K. In view of the analysis of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) we are especially
interested in the role of the variable br, which they consider their preferred measure of
…nancial pressure picking up both the premium in borrowing costs and the probability
that credit is rationed.
Second, separate labour demand equations for rigid/permanent and ‡exible/temporary
labour are estimated. This will also allow an analysis of whether and to what extent,
‡exible labour carries a greater burden of adjustment to demand and …nancial shocks
than permanent employment. One issue which arises in the context of estimating the
employment equation for temporary contracts is that a signi…cant proportion of …rms
do not employ temporary employees. This discouraged Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992)
8The demand shock variable is not considered in the analysis of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) but is
a key consideration of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) and is therefore included here. As in Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (1992) we are unable to construct a relative wage of permanent/temporary labour which
would ideally appear in Equation 1. We essentially assume this to be subsumed into the …xed e¤ects.
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from looking at the behaviour of (log) temporary employment explicitly. With only
minor reservations, we circumvent this issue by recoding zero values on temporary em-
ployment to 0.5. This is clearly preferable to selecting out those …rms that have no
temporary employees. If we instead add an arbitrary constant of 0.5 to all values this
provides a very similar pattern of results to that presented below.9
The model includes a demand shock variable, »it, following Bentolila and Saint-
Paul (1992). Support for the use of the change in log sales as a demand shock variable
is provided by the fact that an AR(1) model for log real sales produces a coe¢cient
of 0.997. We will be interested in considering how permanent and temporary labour
demand varies in response to this demand shock variable.
Since during our extended sample period of 1985 to 2001, a major recession took
place in Spain, the trough of which was reached in 1993, we can consider how the
macroeconomic in‡uences on company-level labour demand, in the form of the set of
time e¤ects ªt vary. These can be compared when estimating separately for permanent
and temporary contract employees to see to what extent temporary employment proved
more responsive to the economic cycle than permanent employment during that period.
Finally, we also focus on the e¤ects of the policy reform of 1997 which reduced
payroll taxes and dismissal costs for those hired under permanent contracts described
in Section 2. We add to Equation 1 a series of interaction terms between our variables
9Note that the issue of zero values for temporary employment does not produce a censored regression
or Tobit model since there is no unobserved threshold. The problem is in taking logs. We have also
estimated these models in levels, with the results being qualitatively similar (these results are available
from the authors on request).
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of interest and a post-1997 dummy to consider variation in response to the 1997 reform.
Our estimator consists of the GMM-System estimator proposed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and examined in detail by Blundell and Bond (1998). These models
control for …xed e¤ects with the estimator being an extension of the GMM estimator of
Arellano and Bond (1991) and estimates equations in levels as well as in …rst-di¤erences.
Where there is persistence in the data such that the lagged levels of a variable are not
highly correlated with the …rst di¤erence, also estimating the levels equations with
a lagged di¤erence term as an instrument o¤ers signi…cant gains, countering the bias
associated with weak instruments (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). We are able to further
motivate the use of the GMM-System estimator by showing that the data would, under
the GMM …rst di¤erence estimator, su¤er from this weak instruments problem. This is
achieved by comparing the …rst di¤erence GMM estimate of the coe¢cient of the lagged
dependent variable to those obtained under OLS and Within Groups estimators (see
Bond et al. 2001). Whilst an OLS estimate of the lagged dependent variable is upward
biased, the Within Groups estimate is downward biased. If the estimate obtained using
the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator lies close to or below the Within Groups estimate
then the likely explanation is that the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator is subject to
the weak instruments problem and the GMM-System estimator should be employed
(where the latter’s estimate of the coe¢cient of the lagged dependent variable should
lie between the OLS and Within Groups estimates). We report results from these
comparisons in the text below. The estimation method requires the absence of second
order serial correlation in the …rst di¤erenced residuals for which the test of Arellano and
Bond (1991) is presented (labelled M2). If the underlying model’s residuals are indeed
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white noise then …rst-order serial correlation should be expected in the …rst-di¤erenced
residuals for which we also present the test of Arellano and Bond (1991), labelled M1.
We also report the results of the Sargan test for instrument validity in the GMM-system
equations and the Di¤erence-Sargan statistic, which tests the validity of the additional
moment conditions associated with the levels equations.
3.1 The Data
The data employed are derived from an annual survey of non-…nancial …rms conducted
by the Central Balance Sheet O¢ce of the Banco de España (see Banco de España,
2000). This is a large scale survey used extensively by the Bank of Spain at an aggregate
level to inform its assessment of the Spanish corporate sector. In terms of gross value
added the survey respondents jointly represent around 35 per cent of the total gross
value added of the non-…nancial corporate sector in Spain. This paper employs data for
the period 1985 to 2001 for which the coverage of the survey has been relatively stable.
We impose restrictions that the …rm has at least 10 employees, is based principally in
the manufacturing sector and is present in the panel for at least …ve consecutive years.
This produces an unbalanced sample of 3,400 manufacturing companies with between
5 and 17 annual observations per company (see Data Appendix).
Summary statistics on the main variables of interest are presented in Table 1.
The survey’s coverage of small …rms increased during the mid-late 1980s which accounts
for the decline in the average size of …rms over time. The proportion of average company
employment on temporary contracts increases during the sample period.
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3.2 Estimation results
Our …rst set of estimation results is presented in Table 2. This presents results obtained
for total employment. No evidence was found here of a signi…cant role for a second lag
in employment and the results we report omit this. Further justi…cation for the use of
the GMM-System estimator is obtained by comparing estimates of the coe¢cient on
the lagged dependent variable under OLS (an upward biased 0.975), Within Groups
(a downward biased 0.809) and that of the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator (at 0.718
below the downward biased Within Groups estimate), whilst that of the GMM-System
estimator lies in between the former two estimates at 0.915. This suggests that the
…rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator is subject to the weak instruments problem examined
by Blundell and Bond (1998). In our preferred estimates reported below we selected
instruments dated from t ¡ 4 to t ¡ 6 in the …rst-di¤erenced equation and ¢t ¡ 3 in
the levels equation in order that the Sargan test statistic reported was not signi…cant
at conventional levels, although these estimates proved very similar to those where the
instrument set included instruments dated t¡ 2; t¡ 3 and ¢t¡ 1.
The estimated long-run wage elasticity in column 2 is –0.37. This compares to an
estimate of -1.86 obtained by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) which they considered to
be quite high relative to previous (mostly aggregate) studies. Our estimate is closer to
the two other …rm-level studies reviewed by Addison and Teixeira (2003), which found
long-run labour cost elasticities of -0.24 for the UK (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and
-0.71 for Portugal (Addison and Teixeira, 2001). Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) obtain a
wage elasticity of UK …rm-level labour demand of -0.76. Our estimate for the long-run
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employment elasticity with respect to the demand shock is 0.05, slightly smaller than
the elasticity found in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) of 0.09 but identical to that
obtained for the UK (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and similar to that of 0.03 for Portugal
(Addison and Teixeira, 2001).
Our results indicate the presence of strong e¤ects from …nancial factors to labour
demand among Spanish manufacturing …rms. This is one of our key results. The
borrowing ratio term brit¡1, the measure of …nancial pressure favoured by Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1999), designed to capture the premium on borrowing costs or the probability
of credit being rationed completely, is statistically signi…cant with a coe¢cient (robust
standard error) of -0.055 (0.016). The addition of the cash ‡ow term, which we include
partly as a control variable, falls short of signi…cance with a coe¢cient (standard error)
of 0.039 (0.032), and gives rise to a minor reduction in the borrowing ratio coe¢cient
(in absolute terms) to -0.041, but this remains signi…cant. In column 3 we consider a
liquidity variable and is not signi…cant. Nor does the inclusion of the net indebtedness
term (B ¡m)=Kit¡1 suggest a role for debt, whilst controlling for the ‡ow borrowing
ratio term brit¡1. When other …nancial variables are omitted the (B ¡m)=Kit¡1 term
is negative but is not signi…cant with a coe¢cient (robust standard error) of -0.016
(0.018). In general, the results suggest a role for …nancial factors in the form of the ‡ow
borrowing ratio variable consistent with the interpretation that …nancing constraints
in‡uence labour demand. The diagnostic tests report satisfactory values with, crucially,
the absence of second-order serial correlation under the M2 test and the Sargan tests
also returning insigni…cant values at standard con…dence levels.
In Table 3 we present estimates of labour demand equations estimated separately
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for permanent and temporary labour. The pattern of results con…rms the hypotheses
outlined previously. First, labour demand for temporary labour is more responsive to
the company-speci…c demand shock »it: In the …rst equation reported for temporary
employment, this attracts a coe¢cient (robust standard error) of 0.628 (0.191), whilst
in the similar speci…cation for permanent employment it attracts a coe¢cient (standard
error) of 0.112 (0.053).
Second, concerning the responses of rigid and temporary employment to an ag-
gregate recession, in Figure 1 we plot the implied variation according the estimated
aggregate time e¤ects ªt estimated in the two equations (in columns 1 and 4). It is
clear that the aggregate e¤ects estimated for permanent employment imply less ag-
gregate ‡exibility than those for temporary employment. Especially notable is how
the recession in 1993 was associated with a much larger aggregate negative e¤ect for
temporary labour demand.
Third, the estimates also con…rm a lower degree of persistence for temporary
than for permanent employment, consistent with lower adjustment costs in the case of
the former. The lagged dependent variable attracts a coe¢cient (robust standard error)
of 0.775 (0.045) in the case of temporary employment and 0.866 (0.017) in the case of
permanent labour in the …rst speci…cation reported for each labour type.
Fourth, we also …nd that the average wage elasticity of labour demand is greater
for temporary than permanent employment. This …nding indicates that there is scope for
potential insider-outsider e¤ects (eg. Bentolila and Dolado, 1994) since the employment
consequences of wage demands are experienced more heavily by temporary employees.
Indeed, in the case of permanent employment, the long-run elasticity although nega-
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tively signed is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero, whilst for temporary employment it
is estimated at -2.11.
Fifth, the consideration of …nancial factors for the two types of labour also re-
veals a stronger e¤ect in the case of temporary labour, in particular in the case of the
‡ow borrowing ratio highlighted by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999). This term attracts an
insigni…cant coe¢cient (robust standard error) of -0.027 (0.025) for permanent employ-
ment (column 1) and -0.355 (0.112) for temporary employment. The cash ‡ow term
CF=Kit¡1 is however at the margin of signi…cance in the case of permanent labour
demand but falls far short of signi…cance in the case of temporary labour.
We conclude the discussion of these results by noting the possibility that the
introduction of temporary contracts when one recognises the importance of …nancial
constraints, may have had more positive consequences for employment than would oth-
erwise have been the case. If temporary contracts, by reducing the ‘…xity’ of labour,
can help employers overcome …nancial constraints then labour demand may increase as
a result10.
The 1997 Reform and Payroll Taxes
We now consider the impact on labour demand of the 1997 labour market reform
described in Section 2 in the form of the role of payroll taxes and the variation induced
by the 1997 reform.11 The assessment of the e¤ects of this reform is relevant since this
10See Rendón (2001) for a related discussion. This author shows that …rms substitute temporary
labour for permanent one and use less debt as their …nancial position improves.
11We also considered repeating our basic labour demand models with the addition of a set of inter-
action terms between the regressors of interest and a dummy variable for the post-1997 period. This
approach failed to indicate any signi…cant changes post-1997, however.
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type of transitory reductions in payroll taxes has been frequently used in the Spanish
case. As noted above, the impact of the 1997 reform will depend on the changes in the
structure of the …rm’s employment. Using data on payroll tax contributions made by
the …rm alongside its direct wage bill we construct an average payroll tax experienced
by the …rm (see also Gruber, 1997). In addition to variation in tax payments induced by
the policy reform, observed variation across …rms will have a number of further sources.
Firms will di¤er in the number of workers they employ with earnings above and below
the earnings thresholds for contributions to be made.12
We measure the impact of the 1997 reform on the …rm’s change in the payroll tax
as the 1998 average payroll tax less its value in 1996.13 The mean payroll tax over the
full period is 27.8 per cent calculated in this way, which compares to a …gure in 2000 of
30.6 per cent available from aggregate …gures for Spain. (Source: the Spanish national
earnings survey, ‘Indice de Costes Laborales’ ). The mean change associated with the
1997 reform is a reduction in the payroll tax of 0.5 percentage points but, importantly,
with signi…cant variation across …rms. The 25th percentile …rm experiences a change of
-1.2 percentage points whilst the 75th percentile is +0.7 percentage points.
12These lower and upper thresholds state that if the monthly income of an employee lies below (above)
a given amount, social security contribution are liable as if income was at that threshold. In 2002, for
instance, the lower (upper) threshold was 516 (2,574.9) Euros. Previously, the thresholds have been
occupation-speci…c.
13Thus ¢t = t2w2N2
w2N2
¡ t1w1N1
w1N1
; where twN represents total social security contributions by the …rm
and wN are the direct remuneration costs. ¢t is the change in average payroll tax experienced by the
…rm calculated between 1996 and 1998. The variable is not time-varying for each …rm. Since information
on social security contributions is not available for all companies, its use involves a reduction in the
sample size by 501 …rms.
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In a competitive labour market and with an inelastic labour supply curve any
change in payroll taxes would induce an o¤setting response to gross pay leaving wage
costs and employment unchanged. However, in non-competitive labour markets where
there is some element of real wage resistance, some of the burden of these costs can
be shifted onto the employer resulting in employment e¤ects. The extent to which
these e¤ects are important remains unsettled. Most macroeconomic studies reviewed in
Nickell and Layard (1999) support their existence but that their magnitude is modest.
However, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) provide evidence suggesting these e¤ects are large,
at least in continental Europe.14 There has been very little microeconomic evidence on
this subject however. Gruber (1997) provides company-level evidence based on a panel
of …rms from Chile where the sample period includes a very pronounced change in
payroll tax rates. The evidence there suggested complete wage shifting to the payroll
tax change with no e¤ect on employment.15
Table 4 presents analysis of the e¤ects of the policy reform based on our pay-
roll tax variable, ¢t. Since the policy reform a¤ected permanent employment directly,
we concentrate on the permanent and total labour demand equations. Since …rms re-
sponded to social security subsidies by changing the composition of their labour force
in favour of permanent jobs, thereby reducing their own tax burden, it is clear that
our measure of the …rm’s change in the payroll tax is not exogenous. To address this
14Pissarides (1998) studies how these e¤ects di¤er under a number of di¤erent labour market models
and how the e¤ects interact with the structure (progressivity) of the tax system and unemployment
bene…ts.
15See also Kugler and Kugler (2002) for evidence on Colombia.
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endogeneity issue we use the change in the average sectoral tax rate as an instrument.16
Our payroll tax variable enters the labour demand equation negatively signed and sta-
tistically signi…cant (albeit at the margin of signi…cance in the case of permanent rather
than total employment) indicating that the reduction in payroll taxes associated with
the 1997 policy reform increased employment. The fact that the result is only signif-
icant in the case of permanent workers is perhaps not too surprising since the reform
only a¤ected new permanent contracts. The point estimate implies that a 5 percent-
age point reduction in the payroll tax increases labour demand by 8 per cent. This
estimate is of the same order as that in Pissarides’s (1998) simulations. In the case
of holding unemployment bene…ts …xed in real terms, Pissarides’s (1998) estimates for
his union bargaining model imply that a 5 percentage point reduction in payroll taxes
would reduce equilibrium unemployment by around 1 percentage point. Nickell and
Layard (1999) suggest e¤ects a little larger than this (ie. around 13 per cent or 1.3
percentage points) as typical of the time-series evidence but are subject to “a great deal
of uncertainty” while the estimates of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for the continental
European economies are somewhat larger still.
4 Conclusion
This paper has examined the demand for labour in a highly regulated labour market
and contrasted the demand for ‡exible and rigid labour. It has previously been argued
that the case of Spain is especially informative regarding labour demand and certain
policy interventions designed to increase ‡exibility in a market where many workers
16See Data Appendix for the precise de…nition of this instrument.
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enjoy high levels of employee security. Relevant characteristics of the Spanish labour
market include the signi…cant di¤erences in protection rights between permanent and
temporary contract labour, the high incidence of temporary contracts over a signi…cant
period of time, and the signi…cant policy reforms that have been introduced a¤ecting
such contracts. In this paper we have extended this literature in a number of ways.
First, we have explicitly compared estimates of the demand for ‡exible labour
with that for labour employed under permanent contracts. Second, we have considered
a role for …nancial factors. Despite a large number of studies of the role of …nancial
conditions in a¤ecting other factor demands, notably …xed investment, previous studies
of labour demand have largely ignored the possible in‡uence of …nancial factors. Third,
we have examined a signi…cant policy reform in 1997. Such reforms provide the ideal
context to appraise arguments concerning the e¤ects of labour market regulation. More-
over, the 1997 policy was di¤erent in nature to the earlier 1984 reform responsible for
the initial liberalisation and subsequent widespread adoption of temporary contracts.
Rather than o¤er an alternative to permanent contracts, the 1997 reform focused on
the reduction in payroll taxes associated with permanent contracts themselves. The
appraisal of this policy reform, which as emphasised by Kugler et al. (2002) was not
a marginal one, is of further signi…cance since in 2001 its scope was further extended.
Fourth, we have revisited the empirical predictions put forward by Bentolila and Saint-
Paul (1992) who focused on variations in labour demand over the cycle as a result of
temporary contracts. In this context our ability to extend the time dimension of a panel
of Spanish …rms, not least to include a period of recession, was highlighted.
Our results make a number of contributions. We have estimated how and to what
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extent the demand for ‡exible labour responds di¤erently from that for rigid labour.
As theory suggests, the demand for ‡exible labour is less persistent, more responsive
to wage costs and is more sensitive to …nancial factors. This leads to the conclusion
that where adjustment in terms of employee numbers is required, the burden of such
adjustment is borne disproportionately by those with temporary contracts. The notion
that such contracts thereby enhance the ability of employers to undertake adjustments
to a number of factors is clearly borne out by the data.
Relative to the predictions confronted with a panel of Spanish manufacturing
…rms by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), we provide supportive evidence of a number
of predictions that Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) were unable to uncover since their
study was restricted to a limited time dimension (from 1985 to 1988). This includes the
…nding that ‡exible labour demand is more sensitive to the demand shock and to the
aggregate economic cycle than that of permanent labour.
As part of our assessment of the 1997 reform we also considered the adjustment
of payroll taxes, exploiting company-speci…c information in payroll costs. Our estimates
suggest that a 5 percentage point reduction in payroll taxes increases employment by 8
per cent. Two notes of caution are in order: First, it should be noted that the introduc-
tion of social security subsidies (as in the 1997 reform) have been usually implemented
on a transitory basis and it is uncertain whether the e¤ects on employment dissapear
once the policy measure is reversed Second, our analysis ignores the revenue losses as-
sociated to the reform that should be taken into account for an overall assessment of the
reform. Our evidence adds to the largely macroeconomic-based evidence of the e¤ects
of payroll taxes. Since this aggregate evidence has produced such a wide range of esti-
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mates, microeconomic evidence of this kind may prove particularly useful in informing
the debate concerning the e¤ects of payroll taxes on employment.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
1985-88 1989-92 1993-96 1997-2001 1985-2000
N employment 324.562 265.042 199.795 187.173 240.794
(NT/N) ∗ 100 9.187 14.984 19.061 19.686 16.018
∆w wage growth 0.023 0.041 0.013 0.012 0.023
br borrowing ratio 0.347 0.414 0.402 0.241 0.352
CF/K cash flow 0.168 0.130 0.120 0.158 0.142
(B −m)/K net indebtedness 0.280 0.240 0.241 0.216 0.243
m/K liquidity 0.110 0.095 0.086 0.100 0.097
ξ real sales growth 0.039 -0.018 0.027 0.044 0.022
Y real sales (1995 prices) 45,943.4 39,278.95 36,636.84 44,639.01 41,389.46
observations 6,858 8,918 8,336 8,373 32,485
Notes: Tables reports sample means. Real sales are thousands of euros (1995
prices).
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Table 2: Total labour demand
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
nit¡1 0.915 (0.013) 0.919 (0.012) 0.919 (0.012) 0.923 (0.011) 0.925 (0.011)
kit 0.042 (0.008) 0.043 (0.007) 0.041 (0.008) 0.039 (0.007) 0.037 (0.007)
¢wit -0.520 (0.069) -0.503 (0.061) -0.516 (0.069) -0.475 (0.059) -0.512 (0.063)
wit¡1 -0.029 (0.021) -0.031 (0.020) -0.027 (0.021) -0.018 (0.019) -0.015 (0.020)
brit¡1 -0.055 (0.016) -0.041 (0.019) -0.057 (0.016) -0.047 (0.019) -0.067 (0.017)
CF=Kit¡1 0.039 (0.032) 0.048 (0.030)
m=Kit¡1 -0.005 (0.032) 0.016 (0.039)
(B ¡m)=Kit¡1 0.019 (0.018) 0.024 (0.024)
»it 0.179 (0.038) 0.180 (0.035) 0.193 (0.036) 0.173 (0.032) 0.186 (0.034)
year e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
M1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M2 (p-value) 0.143 0.147 0.184 0.132 0.142
Instruments t-4..t-6, ¢t-3 t-4..t-6, ¢t-3 t-4..t-6, ¢t-3 t-4..t-6, ¢t-3 t-4..t-6, ¢t-3
Sargan (p-value) 0.237 0.169 0.299 0.196 0.324
Di¤erence-Sargan (p-value) 0.184 0.373 0.163 0.353 0.175
companies 3,400 3,400 3,400 3,400 3,400
observations 29,085 29,085 29,085 29,085 29,085
Notes: Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano
and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported), distributed as chi-square under the
null of instrument validity. Di¤erence-Sargan is a Sargan Test of the validity of the additional moment conditions associated with
the levels equations (p-value reported), distributed as chi-squared under the null of instruments validity, Mj is a test of jth-order
serial correlation in the …rst-di¤erenced residuals. These are both distributed as standard normals under the null hypotheses.
Asymptotic robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Instruments used are the lagged values of the regressors dated from
t-4 to t-6 in the …rst-di¤erenced equation and the …rst di¤erence of the regressors dated t-3 in the levels equation.
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Table 3: Permanent and Temporary labour demand
Permanent employment Temporary employment
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
nit¡1 0.866 (0.017) 0.868 (0.017) 0.865 (0.019) 0.775 (0.045) 0.774 (0.039) 0.783 (0.041)
kit 0.077 (0.012) 0.081 (0.015) 0.080 (0.018) 0.151 (0.042) 0.155 (0.040) 0.142 (0.039)
¢wit -0.345 (0.102) -0.296 (0.093) -0.353 (0.113) -1.097 (0.407) -1.042 (0.366) -0.965 (0.392)
wit¡1 -0.002 (0.039) -0.007 (0.042) -0.004 (0.042) -0.476 (0.172) -0.471 (0.162) -0.405 (0.162)
brit¡1 -0.027 (0.025) -0.002 (0.028) -0.044 (0.024) -0.355 (0.112) -0.341 (0.130) -0.310 (0.112)
CF=Kit¡1 0.085 (0.054) 0.001 (0.223)
m=Kit¡1 -0.063 (0.079) 0.187 (0.196)
»it 0.112 (0.053) 0.121 (0.046) 0.165 (0.050) 0.628 (0.191) 0.696 (0.182) 0.589 (0.166)
year e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
M1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M2 (p-value) 0.420 0.435 0.510 0.906 0.877 0.919
Instruments t-4..t-6, ¢t-3 t-4..t-6, ¢t-3 t-4..t-6, ¢t-3 t-4..t-6, ¢t-3 t-4..t-6, ¢t-3 t-4..t-6, ¢t-3
Sargan (p-value) 0.085 0.058 0.140 0.202 0.146 0.314
Di¤erence-Sargan (p-value) 0.098 0.169 0.241 0.126 0.119 0.306
companies 3,400 3,400 3,400 3,400 3,400 3,400
observations 29,085 29,085 29,085 29,085 29,085 29,085
Notes: See Table 2.
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Table 4: The 1997 Reform and Payroll Taxes
Total employment Permanent employment
nit¡1 0.944 (0.011) 0.917 (0.016)
kit 0.034 (0.008) 0.063 (0.013)
¢wit -0.567 (0.075) -0.469 (0.110)
wit¡1 -0.041 (0.024) -0.049 (0.042)
brit¡1 -0.067 (0.017) -0.060 (0.024)
»it 0.193 (0.046) 0.148 (0.057)
¢tit -0.006 (0.004) -0.016 (0.008)
year e¤ects yes yes
M1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
M2 (p-value) 0.129 0.561
Instruments t-4..t-6, ¢t-3 t-4..t-6, ¢t-3
Sargan (p-value) 0.096 0.458
Di¤erence-Sargan (p-value) 0.024 0.052
companies 2,899 2,899
observations 23,534 23,534
Notes: See Table 2. We add the change in the average tax rate (at the sectoral
level) to the list of instruments.
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Data Appendix
Table A.1 tabulates the number of time-series observations per company.
Table A.1: Panel structure
No of records 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Companies 555 471 411 301 245 167 161
No of records 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
Companies 182 150 178 202 112 245 3,400
Employment
The number of employees during year. The data also distinguish between the
number on permanent and temporary contracts.
Wages
The average company wage is given by direct employment costs (not including
social security contributions) dividend by employment head count and de‡ated by the
GDP de‡ator.
Payroll taxes
The payroll tax paid by the …rm is equal to t = SSwN x100; where SS represents
total social security contributions by the …rm and wN are the direct remuneration costs.
The change in the payroll tax associated with the 1997 reform is calculated as
the di¤erence in the company payroll tax between 1996 and 1998. This value is then
kept by that …rm for the period 1997 to 2001 or whenever the …rm leaves the panel and
is equal to zero before 1997.
This variable is instrumented with the di¤erence in the sectoral average pay-
roll tax rates between 1996 and 1998, using a sectoral disaggregation in 39 industries.
(Source: Spanish National Accounts. Base 1995. Production and generation of income
accounts by industry). As in the case of the …rm-level measure, this value is then kept
by that sector for the period 1997 to 2001 and is equal to zero before 1997.
Liquidity (m=K)
Liquid assets are given by cash and equivalent, normalised on capital stock.
Debt (B=K)
Total outstanding debt divided by capital stock, K (see below). Net debt (B¡m)
subtracts cash and equivalent from the numerator.
Capital stock (K)
This is given by the sum of …xed assets at replacement cost (calculated by the
Central de Balances (CBA) of the Bank of Spain) and working capital less provisions.
Cash ‡ow (CF )
Post-tax pro…t plus depreciation of …xed assets.
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Borrowing ratio (br)
Interest payments divided by cash ‡ow. Where companies have a negative value
for the denominator their borrowing ratio is set equal to 1.
Real Sales (S)
Total company sales, de‡ated by the GDP de‡ator.
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